ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

- UNDERGROUND REGULATIONS
- AS 4801
- MDG 1020
- THE MINES DOCUMENTED SYSTEMS
RISK ASSESSMENT

- Very few mines have a risk assessment
- Little evidence of MDG 1020 being used
- Where R/A has been done there is no cross check to see that controls make the final document
- Generally major controls have not been considered as part of the withdrawal procedures
- Little documentation of consultation
EGRESS ROUTES

- NON SEGREGATED INTAKE (BELT ROAD) WIDELY USED AS 2ND EGRESS

- PRIMARY ESCAPE IS GENERALLY IN TRANSPORT – FEW SYSTEMS INCLUDE PROVISION OF TRANSPORT

- 2ND EGRESS WALKING CONDITIONS ARE OFTEN DIFFICULT

- GENERALLY A LIFELINE EXISTS IN ONE EGRESS

- MOST OPERATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE 2ND EGRESS WALKS

- REFLECTIVE STREAMERS TO INDICATE PRIMARY EGRESS
EARLY WARNING

- TARPS FOR CO MONITORING GENERALLY TRIGGER INVESTIGATION ONLY UNTIL 50ppm

- NOT ALL MINES HAVE CO MONITORING ON PANEL BELTS OR TRIPPERS

- TUBE BUNDLE TARPS NOT ALWAYS KNOWN OR UNDERSTOOD BY CP
TRAINING

- TRAINING SPECIFIED IN MINES SYSTEM OFTEN NOT CARRIED OUT
- DIFFERENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR EMPLOYEES/CONTRACTORS
- STAFF MEMBERS OFTEN MISSING TRAINING
- NO REFRESHER TRAINING IN THE SYSTEM OR AFTER CHANGES
- NO SPECIFIC TRAINING FOR SUPERVISORS
- LIMITED TRAINING FOR CP
- RECORD KEEPING GENERALLY POOR – IS NOT USED TO IDENTIFY MISSED OR OUT OF DATE TRAINING, OR KNOWLEDGE BASED TRAINING
RESCUERS AND TAGGING

- MOST MINES USE FSR ON THE BELT
- MOST MINES USE CABA FROM THE CRIB ROOM
- LACK OF PHONES OR DACS AT CHANGE OVER/REFILL STATIONS
- ONLY ONE MINE HAS A FORM OF “RESPIRABLE AIR CHANGE OVER STATION”
- TAGGING IS STILL THE EXCEPTION
- SIGNAGE POOR – OFTEN ONLY FROM ONE ROAD
- GENERALLY NO CHANGE OVER PROTOCOL
SYSTEM ISSUES

- Generally poor document control
- Non-compliance with review and audit requirements when documented
- No cross check to statutory requirements
- Management plans not included in management review
- Most mines do not have an effective corrective action procedure
OTHER ISSUES

- Generally no documented procedures for rapid, effective sealing of the mine.

- Testing regime poorly addressed in documents, and not effectively complied with when addressed.

- No coherent strategy for provision of first aid skills, including Entonox/Penthane use.

- Communications protocols do not take into account issues with FSR and chemical SCSR.
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

- Risk Assessment
  Basic requirement for a specific R/A
- Second Egress
  Segregated intake or return or intake
  Second transport road
- Rescuers
  Determination of cache/refill distances
  Availability out and back
  Training
  Consideration of RACOS
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

- Communications
  PED or similar
  Tracking devices

- Response
  Control room
  Minimum qualifications of operator

- Transport
  Provision for all personnel

- Training
  Minimum standards
  Out of mine if not current